Pal TAMAS, Budapest
DEWESTERNIZATION AND THE COMING TECHNOLOGICAL FRACTURE OF JOURNALISM

The international trade regime used in the media world was designed for cars, textiles and machines and not for artificial intelligence, software and programming. Already under severe pressure and backless of hyper-globalisation, it is utterly inadequate to face the three main challenges these new technologies pose.

First there is geopolitics and national security. Digital technologies allow foreign powers to hack industrial networks, and cyber-espionage and manipulate social media. Some Eastern media power has been accused of interfering in local politics of Western countries through fake news and vice versa and manipulating of social media in concrete environments. US – Chinese and Russian confrontation imitate [and in some cases fabricate] security threat in telecoms and AI.

Second, there are concerns about individual privacy. Internet platforms are able to collect huge amount of data what people do online and off, and some countries have stricter rules than others to regulate what they can do with it. In some cases, like in the European Union, has enacted fines for companies that fail to protect the EU residents" data.

Third, there is economics. New technologies give a competitive edge to large companies that can accumulate in many areas primary market power. Economies of scale and scope and network effects produce winner-take-all outcomes, and mercantilist policies and practices can result in some firms having what looks like an unfair advantage. In some cases, state surveillance has allowed East European firms accumulate huge amounts of data, which in turn has enabled them to corner the European and partly global facial recognition market. Transnational regulatory cooperation and anti-trust policies could produce new enforcement mechanisms. Even where a truly global approach is not possible -because democratic and non-democratic countries have deep disagreements about many political questions, new

standards, etc. its still possible for regional countries to cooperate among themselves.
In the absence of common rules practices, as data localization, local cloud requirements, and discrimination in favor of national champions will segment regional and national markets. They reduce the gains of sedimented media markets and prevent national strategies and prevent companies from reaping the benefits of scale. But any global order must balance the gains from trade and media markets against the gain from regulatory diversity [in one case maximized when regulations are harmonized or when each national government is entirely free to do what it wants]. In some cases hyper- globalization prioritized the gains over the benefits of regulatory diversity. In some cases this is repeated with new technologies. But in most cases thinking on new technologies are no different from those for traditional domains. De/westernized countries may defend their new regulatory standards and philosophies of cultural integration and national security. But they have no right to internationalize their cultural standards and try to impose their regulations on other countries.
Caught between relentless imperialist protectionism and xenophobia, on one hand, neoliberal coalition on the other, the left if rich countries seems bereft of new ideas. And worse then lacking new ideas is trying to restore a world gone by, which goes against the grain of modern life and modern economy.
This project aims to recreate the conditions of around 1950-1980, which was indeed the. Period of social democratic flourishing [see Branko MILANOVIC about the inequalities and Paul COLLIER about the "Future of Capitalism"]. There is no doubt it was in many respects an extraordinary successful period for the west: economic growth was high, western nations" incomes were converging, inequality was relatively low, and the western working class was richer, then three-quarters of humankind and superior to the rest of the world. But this success occurred under very specific conditions none of which could be recreated in and after 1989. in the beginning nobody believed it in the post -Soviet word, everybody was in that

respect nostalgic. But in 15-20 years other tendencies were already dominant: first, a very large portion of the global workforce, especially after the revolutions those from the former Soviet societies was not competing with workers in developed countries of the West.. secondly, capital did'nt move much in those years. Stagnation, at least in Eastern Europe was quite general and in many countries foreign investment were often the target of nationalisation and if not many were speaking about its even short-term instability.Thirdly, overpopulation , disbalances of educational inequalities, and violence around local conflicts and growing hostility towards immigrants generated permanent tensions on the labour markets. The technological markets of the media became fragmented. Younger age groups in general and the huge immigrant clusters were lost for newspapers and the printed press in general. Social democratic traditions went back for news readers. Solidarity of the 1950/1980 was only nostalgic reminiscences for immigrants. Their cultural integration, with exception of German and British ethnic labour elites went very slowly, especially in Eastern Europe. The result was cultural fragmentation, changing media profiles, inclusion of the public into politically and linguistically closed groups, atomization of the media consumption. This is already the real cultural de/westernization from our perspectives. Naturally there are exclusions from this: the German-Turkish dailies in the big German cities. Important immigrant newspapers are not published in the Post/Soviet world, but immigrant radio stations exist in rich varieties, however such tele-stations of that kind at this point are not known. But mental de/westernization of the whole media system is still going on, especially In East Germany for the local public, in Romania for the local. Hungarians and Oriental pop for Tatars and other Muslim minorities in big Russian cities.